Comments Questions on FAITH AND THE PSYCHE (or Luther and the self)

I am sharing my notes first, to mention some of the ideas in the page that follows, along with my comments and questions. First, I must echo the Gospel of John chapter 17 verse 22. Glory has been given to Christ from the Father and Christ has imputed glory to/on the disciples. Do we share in that same glory? Yes, amen and amen . . . . . . .  

My Comments and Questions:

“twofold subjectivity” is silliness

“fact that man himself becomes the object of reflection” illusion a trick the brain is playing on itself, how is that for demeaning and debasement of the self?

Reduction of self equaling “as German mysticism itself expresses it, to nothing” This did not originate from Western mysticism, much less German mysticism.

“the concrete aspects (das Konkretum) of my life”  what part of the self is concrete, must we cling to this concept?  (this result of cognition) or is clinging what leads to suffering?     

“shrivel to a mathematical point ” how do you get the body (Merleau -Ponty) to shrivel, the heck with this construct business, the corporeal is tacitly impervious.  The body is us, dirt (and H2O) filled with God's breath, ruach, and they became "living souls (nephesh)" (or quite literally, they became living beings

Is it somatos or sarx with which the Apostle Paul struggles?  body or flesh? sarx.   Sarx is flesh, which Paul struggles. He and Luther were, "I cannot do anything right"  Some scholars believe the later writings of Luther's granted the self more efficacy and less depravity . . . . .   

“before God (life) is taken as a whole and condemned as a unit” Is this the early Luther as opposed to the later Luther who gives more substantiality and efficacy to the “I’  Bonhoeffer said “Christ is for me”

“this abstraction is always merely in the process of being carried out, merely an act, never something actually carried out” This reminds me of process, whereby  the self develops over time to become more like Christ.  As Luther would say, we are ‘littler Christs’”

“the transcendental I’s turnabout from accusation to faith must become operative or at least noticeable” how does this correlate or contradict the passage altogether, if at all? Is there two parts of the subject indeed? I versus I? that is distinctive to Lutheran theology then. 

And Werner Elert writes:    

12. FAITH AND THE PSYCHE 

The Lutheran doctrine of justification distinguishes a twofold subjectivity of man. This does not presuppose any critical power of discernment based on special knowledge; it is connected with the elementary fact that man himself becomes the object of reflection. If in his reflections he thinks to a conclusion in the direction of what he is and in the direction of what he could or should be, he stands before that maze of destiny and guilt which was developed as the “primal experience” (Urerlebnis). If finally one takes as the object of reflection the laws of thinking itself that are applied here—for Luther this is “reason” (ratio) in the formal sense—the thinking I shrivels to a mathematical point without content and without extent. Nevertheless, the content of my consciousness has not vanished, and all facts and possibilities belonging to it characterize “me.” They are my possessions. I myself am all this. I imagine; I know, and I have the will; I feel, and I have the desire. Thus there is a twofold subjectivity: the transcendental I as a “mathematical point” (punctum mathematicum) and the psychic I that is saturated with content.

Later we came upon the fundamental difference between Luther and mysticism. Whereas German mysticism, in its technically flawless carrying-through of the reduction of thinking to the transcendental I—or, as German mysticism itself expresses it, to nothing—sees the birth of God in man, for Luther it is a question of a judicial act in the strict sense. That separation of I and I is carried through as “self-accusation” (accusatio sui). I myself am the object of my reflection, because I am compelled to look at the concrete aspects (das Konkretum) of my life or, what amounts to the same thing, of my consciousness, with the eyes of God. To be sure, these concrete aspects, too, then shrivel to a mathematical point; yet this does not occur because they should be forgotten or obliterated but because God’s judgment, the thoughts of which the transcendental I follows up, lies in another dimension, since it takes all life “from the outside” as a unit. Looked at from within, life keeps its total content as a multitude of separate things—before God it is taken as a whole and condemned as a unit.

Furthermore, this distinguishing of a twofold subjectivity is the formal presupposition of the doctrine of justification. The subject of the faith that receives the “righteousness of God” (justitia Dei) is the transcendental I. It is altogether empty, merely a “mathematical point” (punctum mathematicum). The righteousness adjudged to it is “alien” (aliena) in the strict sense. Here, on principle, the matter could end and, so far as the righteousness “that avails before God” (die vor Gott gilt) is concerned, must end. But just as the differentiation between I and I in the form of the judicial act can or should not obliterate the psychic state, so the mere specification of faith as a point (Punktualitat) cannot do away with the relationship of the transcendental I to the psychic I. Of course, no change can take place when the second is judged by means of the first. The judgment will always be an “accusation” (accusatio). But this does not mean that the concrete aspects (das Konkretum) of our life undergo no actual change in content because of faith. The very opposite is true. The transcendental I is, of course, merely an abstraction. Although this abstraction is necessary, it is possible and significant only as long as there exist concrete aspects (Konkretum) filled with psychic life. Yes, this abstraction is always merely in the process of being carried out, merely an act, never something actually carried out—otherwise it itself would have become a psychic fact. Consequently, it is always in the process of being related to the concrete aspects (das Konkretum) of life. Then, however, the transcendental I’s turnabout from accusation to faith must become operative or at least noticeable in this relationship too. To express it in another way: what happens or has happened to the transcendental I cannot fail to affect the sum total of the content of consciousness.

Elert, Werner. The Structure of Lutheranism (Concordia Classics Series) . Concordia Publishing House. Kindle Edition.